This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between frequency of scheduled transportation services and their substitutability with personal transportation (using distance as a proxy). We study the interaction between a monopoly …rm providing a high-speed scheduled service and private transportation (i.e., car). Interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase the frequency of service on longer routes when competing with personal transportation because by providing higher frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares which can boost its pro…ts.
A problem faced by companies providing scheduled transportation (airlines, railway companies, etc.) is that it is impossible to achieve the level of mobility o¤ered by the use of a private vehicle. Customers traveling by car do not have to bear a schedule delay cost inherent to the limited choice of departure times that characterizes scheduled services. However, providers of scheduled transportation can make their product more attractive when competing with consumers'personal vehicles by o¤ering high-frequency, high-speed services. There are also cases in which driving is not a relevant alternative (when the distance between the endpoints is particularly long), and in this case the problem facing a scheduled carrier is to make its service attractive with respect to the option of not traveling at all. These two problems may have di¤erent solutions; however, no di¤erentiation between them has been o¤ered in the literature.
This paper …lls this void by examining fare and frequency choices of a monopoly provider of scheduled transportation services. We compare the case where the customer's next best available alternative is driving with the scenario where driving is not a relevant option (i.e., it is a dominated alternative). The model yields testable predictions regarding frequencydistance relationships, which we put to the test using data from the European airline industry (where services are provided by a single carrier on over sixty percent of airport-pair markets).
In the theoretical part, we model a carrier (which we will consider to be an airline, although the analysis is easily applicable to high-speed rail as well) choosing fares and frequency of services, given that it enjoys an exogenous advantage in terms of higher speed of service than the private vehicle. This part builds on Brueckner (2004) We …nd that the monopolist's choice crucially depends on whether driving is a dominated option or not. The carrier will reduce the frequency of service for longer trips when driving is dominated but, more interestingly, the relationship between frequency and distance may 1 reverse when driving is not dominated and carriers compete with personal transportation.
Our result is explained by a trade-o¤ between two forces. First, the provider of scheduled transportation services will always incur an extra cost when increasing frequency. Indeed, higher frequency implies additional …xed costs and reduces the opportunity of exploiting density economies which, in the case of airlines, arise from the use of bigger aircraft at high load factors. Second, an increase in distance may boost the demand for high-speed scheduled transportation services on short-haul routes where the use of personal vehicles is a relevant option for travelers. This is because an increase in distance makes the high-speed transportation mode more competitive and so providers of scheduled transportation services are able to increase frequency and charge higher fares.
On short-haul routes, our theoretical model shows that the positive e¤ect of distance on frequency derived from charging higher fares outweighs the negative e¤ect derived from incurring extra costs. This explains the main result of our analysis: the positive relationship between frequency and distance on routes where personal transportation is a relevant option. However, on long-haul routes where driving is a dominated option, an increase in distance does not necessarily imply an increase in the demand for scheduled services. Hence, we can expect a negative relationship between frequency and distance since the provider of scheduled services tries to minimize costs (and avoid potential travelers staying at home).
Finally, from the perspective of the social optimum, we …nd that a monopoly carrier provides lower frequency of service than is socially optimal and the number of passengers making use of the scheduled transportation services is ine¢ ciently low (as is usual for models of this kind).
Our model relates to the issue of intermodal competition and choice of transport mode 1 and, from a broader perspective, to the literature on product di¤erentiation. Since with longer distances scheduled services become more attractive than personal transportation, due to their higher speed, we study how the monopolist's choice changes as the substitutability between the two transportation options increases. Product di¤erentiation has been analyzed in several studies of the airline industry (e.g., Berry, 1990 , Berry et al., 1996 , Borenstein and Netz, 1999 . However, these studies do not consider the way in which substitutable 1 The issue of mode substitution and its e¤ects has been discussed, for example by Bel (1997) , González-Savignat (2004) , Janic´(2003) and López-Pita and Robusté (2004) . Some studies on choice of transport mode conclude that commuters mostly consider frequency of service (and more generally convenience of service) as one of the factors determining their elasticity (Voith, 1997 and Asensio, 2002) ; or the impact of urban transit projects (Baum-Snow and Kahn, 2000).
transportation options in ‡uence carriers'frequency choices.
We test the predictions of our theoretical model concerning the relationship between the length of haul and frequency using data on annual frequencies at the airline-route level. Our sample includes about 900 routes that link the ten largest airports in Europe with other European destinations (EU27 + Switzerland and Norway) in the period 2006-2007. The empirical application examines the relationship between airlines'frequency choices and distance controlling for demand shifters at the route level, the intensity of competition and airline attributes. A spline regression that shows the relationship between frequency and distance in our dataset, makes it advisable to di¤erentiate between routes shorter and longer than 500 kilometers (311 miles). Interestingly, the empirical application shows that airlines'frequency increases with distance for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. In contrast, frequency decreases with distance for routes longer than 500 kilometers. Thus, the predictions of the theoretical model are con…rmed. As expected, frequency increases with demand (captured by several variables). We also …nd that airlines compete aggressively in frequency of service, low-cost carriers provide lower quality products, and airport presence strongly in ‡uences the number of ‡ights that airlines o¤er on the routes served.
Previous empirical work has analyzed the determinants of ‡ight frequency. In fact, our empirical application is closely related to the studies by Pai (2007) and Wei and Hansen (2007) . Pai (2007) estimates the determinants of ‡ight frequency in the US airline market, observing a decreasing relationship between frequency and distance. From a di¤erent perspective, Wei and Hansen (2007) develop an application for three game-theoretic models of airline choices, obtaining that frequency on long-haul routes is less than on short-haul routes. These …ndings are in line with our results when driving is a dominated option. Thus, although these two previous studies adequately explain the relationship between frequency and distance on long-haul routes, our results suggest that the applicability of their …ndings to short-haul markets is limited. 2 To sum up, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that the relationship between frequency choices and distance depends crucially on the presence of personal trans- The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium and compares the equilibrium outcome with the social optimum. An empirical application to the European airline market is provided in Section 3 and a brief conclusion closes the paper. All the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The model
Our model is based on indirect utilities of heterogeneous travelers choosing between scheduled services and personal transport. We consider an air carrier as the provider of scheduled services, for the purpose of exposition, but other modes of transportation (in particular, the high-speed train) can easily …t into our framework.
The model combines elements of Brueckner's (2004) monopoly scheduling model along with a di¤erentiation of consumers by their value of time similar to the one suggested in Bilotkach (2006) . In the model, utility for a consumer traveling by air is given by Consumption Schedule delay disutility + V alue of available time.
Consumption is y p air where y is the common level of income and p air is the airline's fare.
Letting H denote the time circumference of the circle, consumer utility then depends on expected schedule delay (de…ned as the di¤erence between the preferred and actual departure times) which equals H=4f , where f is number of (evenly spaced) ‡ights operated by the airline. The Schedule delay disutility is equal to a disutility parameter > 0 times the expected schedule delay expression from above, thus equaling H=4f = =f , where H=4.
Finally, the available time at the destination is computed as the di¤erence between passengers' total trip time (T ) and the actual traveling time which depends on the distance 4 between the origin and the destination (d) and the plane's speed (V ), thus equaling T d=V .
We assume a large enough T so that T > d=V . Thus, taking into account the traveler's speci…c value of time , the V alue of available time at the destination equals (T d=V ),
where is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range [0; 1]. Hence, utility from air
However, consumers can also make use of an alternative surface transport mode (i.e., car)
obtaining a utility of Consumption + V alue of available time since there is no schedule delay in this case. Therefore utility from driving is u car = y cd+ [T d= ( V )], where cd is the cost of the trip that increases with distance, captures the airline/car speed di¤erential and 2 (0; 1=2), i.e., we assume that traveling by car is at least twice as slow as air travel, and T is large enough so that T > d= ( V ). Additionally, we allow for partially-served markets because consumers can also choose not to travel and stay at home, obtaining a utility of u o = y.
Observe that, since air travel is faster than travel by private vehicle, the u air u car di¤erential is greater the higher the consumer's value of time ( ). In other words, both u air and u car increase with , but u air is steeper than u car . This basically ensures that the higher a consumer's value of time, the more likely she is to ‡y rather than drive, other things being equal.
Disregarding the trivial cases (either where nobody travels or where everyone uses the same mode of transport), we can state the following: a consumer will undertake air travel when u air > max fu car ; u o g. The inequality u air > u car requires > e with
and the inequality u air > u o holds for > with
Finally, a consumer will drive when u car > max fu air ; u o g, where u car > u air requires < e and u car > u o requires > b with
3 Note that cars are much slower than new high-speed trains, which have been designed to reach a speed above 250 km/h.
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Consumers with a su¢ ciently high value of time will undertake air travel and consumers with a su¢ ciently low time value will stay at home. Consequently, we are left with two possible scenarios depending on whether driving is a dominated alternative or not: the case with drivers where 0 < b < e < 1 (Scenario 1); and the situation where there are no drivers with 0 < e < b < 1 (Scenario 2). These two scenarios are represented in Figures 1 and 2 below.
Insert here Figures 1 and 2 As suggested before, we observe that u air is steeper than u car because 2 (0; 1=2) and thus, as approaches 1, the airline carries more tra¢ c.
The case with drivers (Scenario 1) requires b < e and, from this inequality we obtain Looking at our data for the European airline markets examined in the empirical application in Section 3, this cut-o¤ distance d is evaluated at around 500 kilometers (311 miles).
For each of the two scenarios, the analysis that follows derives the demand functions, speci…es the airline's cost structure, and describes the pro…t functions. Afterwards, both the equilibrium and the social optimum are analyzed in each scenario.
Scenario 1: driving is not a dominated alternative
Under Scenario 1, a traveler will ‡y when > e . Otherwise, the consumer will use private transportation. Then, using (1), the airline's demand is given by As in Brueckner (2004) , it is assumed that all seats are …lled, so that load factor equals 100% and therefore s = q air =f , i.e., aircraft size can be determined residually dividing the airline's total tra¢ c on a route by the number of ‡ights. Note that cost per seat, which can be written (d) =s + , visibly decreases with s capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies from operating a larger aircraft holding the load factor constant) which are unequivocal in the airline industry. 5 In other words, having a larger tra¢ c density on a certain route reduces the impact on the cost associated with higher frequency.
Therefore, the airline's total cost from operating on a route is
Thus the airline's pro…t is air = p air q air c, which can be rewritten using (5) as
indicating that average variable costs are independent of the number of ‡ights.
After plugging (4) into (6) and maximizing, the …rst-order condition for the fare is
(2p air cd + =f ) = 0 and, from this condition, it is easy to obtain the following expression
4 On the other hand, a traveler will prefer to drive instead of stay at home (i.e., not travel at all) for so that fares increase with variable costs and with distance, and they decrease with schedule delay and with the speed of personal transportation ( V ).
On the other hand, the …rst-order condition for frequency is given by
indicating that frequency increases with passengers'disutility of delay, carrier's margin (p air
) and the speed of personal transportation, and decreases with the cost of frequency and distance.
The second-order conditions @ bining the two …rst-order conditions, we obtain the following equilibrium condition
The equilibrium frequency is shown graphically in Figure 3 , as in Brueckner (2004) and
Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007), where we observe that the f solution occurs at an intersection between a cubic expression (Cf ) and a linear expression (Lf ) whose vertical intercept is negative. The slope of Lf must be positive for the solution to be positive and thus we assume that is small enough for this to be the case. We observe that there are two possible positive solutions, but only the second one satis…es the second-order condition. 6 Insert here Figure 3 Looking at (9) together with Figure 3 , we can carry out a comparative statics analysis for all the parameters in the model. Although some e¤ects do not seem trivial from inspection of (9), the lemma below ascertains the overall e¤ect by analyzing the sign of the total di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to each parameter.
Lemma 2 In Scenario 1, the equilibrium frequency falls with an increase in the marginal cost per seat ( ). Frequency also decreases with the speed of both plane (V ) and car ( ) if 6 Positivity of the Hessian determinant requires p air > 4f . Observe that for the second intersection to be relevant, the slope of Cf must exceed the slope of Lf , i.e.,
V . Using the …rst-order conditions for p air and f , this expression reduces to p air > 4f , which is exactly the condition required by the positivity of the Hessian determinant.
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> cd. However, it rises with the disutility of delay ( ) and the cost of driving (c).
Looking at the e¤ect of distance on the equilibrium ‡ight frequency, although the e¤ect is in general indeterminate, we observe that df dd > 0 can hold at least for su¢ ciently low distances.
As expected, there is a positive relationship between and f since carriers increase frequency as passengers' disutility of delay increases. When the cost of driving (c) rises, the equilibrium frequency also increases because the car becomes a worse option and more passengers choose air travel. When the marginal cost per seat ( ) increases, frequency falls since air travel becomes a less competitive option.
Note that is the airline/car speed di¤erential and that when increases the car's speed increases relative to that of the airplane, and driving becomes a more attractive option for travel (for > cd, so that the cost per seat is higher than the cost of driving). Thus, more passengers prefer personal transportation and ‡ight frequency falls. Finally, the e¤ect of plane's speed (V ) seems to be somewhat counterintuitive since frequency falls when V rises (again for > cd). Yet, higher speed of the aircraft means that the traveler reaches her …nal destination faster, compensating for the disutility of schedule delay.
Looking at the e¤ect of distance on equilibrium frequency, our result suggests that the airline may choose to increase the frequency of service as distance increases. This result appears counterintuitive at …rst. Indeed, with longer distance driving becomes a less attractive substitute for ‡ying, as the ratio of remaining time for the driver to remaining time for the ‡yer
shrinks with distance. Then, as distance increases, the airline will have less incentive to increase the quality of its product, and can simply charge the customers more as demand grows by itself. In fact, the …rst-order condition for f (see (8) ) tells us exactly that:
with higher distance, other things being equal, our carrier can a¤ord to reduce the frequency (and save money). Thus, distance has a negative direct e¤ect on frequency.
The answer to this puzzle lies in the …rst-order condition for p air which shows a positive indirect e¤ect of distance on frequency through fares (see (7)) since p air (d
The lemma above suggests that the indirect e¤ect may prevail.
Air travel is perceived as a better option than driving as distance increases because it is faster and reduces travel time and, as a consequence, our monopolist carrier faces a higher demand as distance increases. Since there is a positive relationship between p air and f , when facing a higher demand (as distance increases) our monopolist can boost pro…ts by increasing ‡ight frequency. Thus, in addition to the marginal cost associated with higher frequency, the airline can obtain the marginal bene…t in terms of the higher price it will be able to 9 charge (in addition to the price increase due to longer distance already present in (7)). What Lemma 2 says, then, is that the airline will increase its service quality (frequency) when the marginal bene…t from doing so outweighs the marginal cost; moreover, the set of parameter values where this will happen will be non-empty.
Scenario 2: driving is a dominated alternative
The case without drivers is not nearly as exciting: we observe the empirically con…rmed decreasing relationship between frequency and distance.
Under Scenario 2, a traveler will ‡y when > and stay home otherwise. From (2), demand for air travel is given by
and costs and pro…ts are as in Scenario 1 (see (5) and (6)). After plugging (10) into the pro…t function and maximizing, the …rst-order condition for the fare is
(2p air + =f ) = 0 and, from this condition, we obtain
which shows that fares rise with passengers'total time, variable costs and aircraft's speed, and fall with schedule delay and distance. Comparing (7) and (11), we observe that p air increases with distance in Scenario 1, but the sign of this e¤ect changes in Scenario 2. This is explained by the di¤erent kinds of competition existing in the two scenarios. On the one hand, when competing against driving, ‡ying becomes more attractive as distance increases and thus the airline can increase fares. On the other hand, when competing against staying at home, ‡ying becomes less attractive for longer distances and the airline tries to compensate this negative e¤ect by lowering fares.
The …rst-order condition for frequency is given by
showing that frequency increases with passengers'disutility of delay, carrier's margin (p air ) and airline's speed, whereas it decreases with passengers'total time and the cost of frequency.
Di¤erently from Scenario 1, the e¤ect of distance on f is unclear.
By combining the two …rst-order conditions, we obtain the following equilibrium condition
As in Scenario 1, the f solution occurs at an intersection of Cf and Lf whose vertical intercept is negative. It is su¢ cient to assume a large T to have a positive sloping Lf so that there are positive values for f . As in Scenario 1, there are two possible positive solutions, but only the second one satis…es the second-order condition. 7 The comparative statics e¤ects are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 In Scenario 2, equilibrium ‡ight frequency falls with an increase in the marginal cost per seat ( ). However, frequency rises with the disutility of delay ( ), the plane's speed (V ) and passengers'total time (T ).
Finally, looking at the e¤ect of distance, we observe that df dd < 0, i.e., equilibrium ‡ight frequency decreases with distance.
As under Scenario 1, we observe f ( + ) and f ( ). When passengers'total time (T ) rises, more passengers are willing to undertake air travel since the utility of ‡ying increases and, as a consequence, the equilibrium frequency increases. Finally, when the plane's speed increases (V ), we observe the same e¤ect as with T , i.e., the valuation of air travel increases and thus the equilibrium frequency rises.
Looking at the e¤ect of distance, from the …rst-order conditions we observe that the direct e¤ect on frequency is unclear (see (12) ) and there is a negative indirect e¤ect through fares (see (11) ) since p air (d ) and f (p air + ). The above lemma states that the indirect e¤ect outweighs the direct one.
Combining the results from Lemmas 1-3, we deduce that the equilibrium frequency can increase with distance when driving is not a dominated option (i.e., Scenario 1), whereas it decreases with distance when driving is disregarded by consumers as a relevant mode of transport (i.e., Scenario 2), as stated in the proposition that follows. 7 The second-order conditions @ as a better option than driving as distance increases because it is faster and reduces travel time. Then airlines increase service quality with distance by o¤ering higher frequency at a higher fare.
As we suggested above, our result is due to a trade-o¤ between two forces. On the one hand, increasing frequency always implies an extra cost for the provider of scheduled transportation services in terms of higher …xed costs and lower bene…ts from density economies which, in the case of airlines, arise from using bigger aircraft at high load factors. On the other hand, an increase in distance may boost the demand for high-speed scheduled transportation services on short-haul routes where the use of private vehicles is a relevant option for travelers. This is because an increase in distance makes the high-speed transportation mode more competitive and so providers of scheduled transportation services are able to increase frequency and charge higher fares. Thus, the relationship between frequency choices and distance depends crucially on the presence of personal transportation.
The social optimum
Having analyzed the monopoly airline's choice, our attention now shifts to welfare analysis in which a social planner decides ‡ight frequency and tra¢ c so as to maximize social surplus, which is computed as the sum of total utility and airline pro…t. We need to di¤erentiate between the two scenarios.
Scenario 1: driving is not a dominated alternative
Total utility for passengers undertaking air travel is u air =
where denotes the air-travel/driving margin. Therefore, carrying out the integration we obtain
Total utility for driving passengers is u car =
denotes the driving/staying margin. Integrating across drivers we obtain
Finally, total utility for "stayers" is
From (6), airline's total pro…t equals air = (p air )
The total welfare function is computed by adding utilities and pro…ts, i.e., W = u air + u car + u o + air . 8 This expression, after substituting (14), (15), (16) and (17), becomes
The planner chooses and , which determine the optimal air and road tra¢ c, along with ‡ight frequencies to maximize (18) . Observe that airfares do not appear in the expression because they are transfers between airlines and air travelers.
From the …rst-order condition for frequency we obtain
which indicates that the optimal frequency increases with the disutility of delay and with the proportion of air travelers, whereas it decreases with the cost of frequency. 8 This analysis implicitly assumes that the "gasoline market" is perfectly competitive. If the "gasoline market" is either imperfectly competitive or regulated so that the price is kept above cost, then (at least part of) the cost drivers incur is somebody's pro…t. In the case in which all the cost of driving represents the pro…t of "gasoline companies" (i.e., car = cd Z d ), the welfare function that the social planner is to maximize has to incorporate this new element, so that it becomes W = u air + u car + u o + air + car .
In fact, taking into account a positive pro…t for "gasoline …rms" makes driving a better travel option from the viewpoint of the social planner. In this framework, the socially desired number of ‡yers and "stayers" decreases, the number of drivers increases, and equilibrium frequency can be both suboptimal or excessive depending on the value of cd. More information on this particular case is available from the authors upon request.
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The …rst-order condition for choice of
and, by comparing (1) with (20) it is easy to check that e > e so since p air > (because otherwise the airline would have negative pro…ts). Therefore, air tra¢ c is suboptimal and there are too many drivers in equilibrium.
The …rst-order condition for choice of yields
so that b = b so and thus the amount of "stayers" is socially optimal.
Insert here Figure 4 From (19) and (20), we obtain the following expression
The social optimum and equilibrium are easily compared because the RHS is identical and the only di¤erence in the LHS is the absence of the 2 factor multiplying the expression.
As a result, the socially optimal ‡ight frequency is higher than the equilibrium frequency, as show in the …gure below Insert here Figure 5 The results are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 4 Under Scenario 1, both the equilibrium ‡ight frequency and air tra¢ c are suboptimal (i.e., f < f SO and e so < e ).
Therefore, in the eyes of the social planner, more drivers should undertake air travel.
To achieve this, the airline should increase ‡ight frequency. 
From the planner's …rst-order conditions for f and , we obtain
which is the same condition as in Scenario 1 (see (19) ); and
and, by comparing (2) with (24) it is easy to check that so < since p air > . Therefore, air tra¢ c is again suboptimal. Finally, from (19) and (24), we obtain the following expression
As in Scenario 1, the social optimum and equilibrium are easily compared because the RHS is identical and the only di¤erence in the LHS is the absence of the 2 factor multiplying the expression. As a result, there is also an underprovision of ‡ight frequency in absence of drivers as summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 5 Under Scenario 2, both the equilibrium ‡ight frequency and air tra¢ c are suboptimal (i.e., f < f SO and so < ).
Hence, the number of "stayers" is no longer e¢ cient in Scenario 2, since some of them should undertake air travel to achieve the social optimum. To carry the extra passengers needed to obtain e¢ ciency, our carrier should increase frequency, as in Scenario 1.
To sum up, the social optimum analysis performed under the two scenarios considered
suggests that higher ‡ight frequency should be provided by the carrier so that more passengers make use of air travel. by O¢ cial Airlines Guide (OAG Data market analysis publication). We exclude observations for airlines that o¤er fewer than 52 frequencies per year on a particular route: operations with less than one ‡ight per week should not be considered as scheduled.
Our theoretical model predicts the possibility of increasing frequency with length of haul for routes on which potential customers may consider driving as a viable alternative to ‡ying. Figure 6 shows the spline that estimates the relationship between distance and frequency in our dataset without imposing any restriction or shape in the functional form of this relationship.
Insert here Figure 6 Results of the spline suggest that the frequency-distance relationship changes at a haul length of about 500 kilometers (311 miles). Speci…cally, this …gure suggests a higher frequency on longer routes for distances less than 500 kilometers; the direction of the relationship is reversed for routes longer than 500 kilometers (note that, for the sake of clarity, we depict the spline only for distances less than 1; 000 kilometers). However, since Figure 6 presents a rough picture, we must control for several route features and airline speci…c factors to come to a de…nite conclusion.
An obvious but important feature of the theoretical model is that there is a positive relationship between ‡ight frequency and demand for air services. The empirical application is based on examining determinants of airlines'frequency choices. Thus, to be consistent with our theoretical model, we have to include distance together with the usual regional variables (population, income, etc.) as explanatory variables to capture relevant air demand shifters at the route level. 10 We de…ne routes as air services between two di¤erent airports, so that one city-pair market (e.g., LondonMilan) may include several routes.
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Lemmas 2 and 3 in the theoretical model state that frequency decreases with the airline/car speed di¤erential ( ), while it increases with the disutility of delay ( ). We also observe that distance is a relevant measure of the possible advantage of airlines with respect to cars, but it is not the only one: availability and quality of surface road network will also play a major role. In our empirical speci…cations, we use an indicator for the absence of direct roadways between the endpoints (i.e., cases in which at least one of the cities is located on an island) as a crude measure of car/plane substitutability beyond simple distance.
Thus, distance and island endpoints explain, to a large extent, aircraft speed advantage in comparison with other transportation modes. In the same way, the disutility of delay should be more important on short-haul routes in which personal transportation is a relevant option (i.e., driving is not a dominated alternative).
Additionally, the theoretical model also predicts a negative relationship between frequency and the marginal cost per seat ( ); and in the empirical application we include some airline attributes (i.e., airport presence, exploitation of connecting tra¢ c) that may in ‡uence the marginal cost per seat of carriers or, alternatively, their marginal revenue given the marginal cost per seat (Borenstein, 1989; Berry et al., 1996) .
Beyond the theoretical model, the intensity of airline competition is also taken into account as an explanatory variable since, other things being equal, the speci…c demand for an airline is in ‡uenced both by service quality of other airlines operating on the same route and of surface transportation modes. Note that our theoretical model considers a monopoly provider of scheduled transportation services, while our empirical analysis uses a sample of routes with di¤erent market structures. However, a large proportion of the routes in our sample have a high level of concentration. In fact, 54% of routes are monopoly routes and the concentration index (HHI) is higher than 0:80 in an additional 6% of routes, so the monopoly seems to be the best-…tting market structure for about 60% of the routes included in our sample.
Eventually, the following equation will be estimated:
where the dependent variable is annual frequencies of airline k from airport i to airport j (F requency ijk ). We consider the following variables as exogenous explanatory variables of airlines'frequency choices: 11 1. P opulation ij : Weighted average of population at the origin and destination regions of the route (NUTS 2 level). Airline frequencies should be higher on routes that link more populated regions due to higher demand for air travel.
2. GDP C ij : Weighted average of Gross Domestic Product per capita at the origin and destination regions of the route (NUTS 2 level). Weights are based on population.
Airline frequencies should be higher on routes that link richer regions due to higher demand for air travel.
D capital ij
: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when one of the route endpoints is located in the political capital of the corresponding country. Employees of public administrations may require air services to carry out their professional duties.
D island j
: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when at least one of the endpoints is located on an island. On islands, alternative transport modes (ships) are poorer substitutes to airline services than surface transport modes (cars, trains) on the mainland. Therefore, demand for air services should be higher when one of the endpoints of the route is an island.
5. T ourism j : Percentage of employment in hotels and restaurants in the destination region of the route (NUTS 2 level). Airline frequencies should be higher on routes where the destination has signi…cant tourist activity due to the higher demand for air services.
6. HHI ij : Her…ndahl-Hirschman index in terms of airline frequencies at the route level.
Since airlines compete in fares and frequencies, they should increase frequencies when competition from other carriers is tougher.
D LCC k
: Dummy variable that takes value 1 for low-cost carriers. We de…ne as low-cost carriers those airlines that do not use a business fare class on any route and have only economy class cabins. At least in Europe, the route network of low-cost carriers is based on point-to-point services. Therefore, their frequencies should be lower than those of other airlines that may be operating hub-and-spoke networks.
D interhub k
: Dummy variable that takes value 1 for hubbing airlines that use the origin airport as the spoke of its hub (e.g., Lufthansa's ‡ights to Frankfurt). These airlines should have a high number of frequencies to feed their hubs.
9. Airport-presence k : Given the importance of this element, we use two variables to de…ne the presence of the airline at the origin airport. First, the total number of destinations served by the airline from the origin airport (Destination k ). Second, the market share of the airline in terms of total departures from the origin airport (Airportshare k ).
These variables are highly correlated so they should be estimated separately to avoid multicollinearity. Our baseline speci…cation includes Destination k as explanatory variable, but the results are very similar regardless of the indicator of airport presence used.
Note that the frequency that an airline sets at the route level should be high when its presence in the origin airport is strong. Airport dominance allows an airline to have control of the slots and facilities at the terminal building (gates, check-in counters, etc.)
that are needed to o¤er high frequencies. This has been well documented in the literature since the seminal work of Borenstein (1989) . In addition to this, a high amount of operations in a large airport by an airline usually indicates the use of that airport to exploit connecting tra¢ c (in our sample, the only exception is Easyjet at Gatwick).
Our empirical strategy involves estimating equation (26) for routes with less and more than 500 kilometers. This will allow us to examine the relationship between frequencies and distances depending on whether driving is a dominated alternative or not. One may be tempted to suggest a regression over the entire sample with a dummy variable indicating routes shorter than 500 kilometers. However, our hypothesis does not really tell us what the sign of this variable should be. Rather, it just says that the slope of the frequency-distance relationship is positive up to 500 kilometers and negative afterwards, a conclusion that does not say how average frequencies in the two ranges compare. 12 Note that the dummy variable for islands may distort the results with regard to our main hypothesis. Indeed, driving may not be a viable option even on short-haul routes when one of the endpoints is an island. Furthermore, the variable for islands may also distort results 12 In any case, it is interesting to mention results of estimating equation (26) for the entire sample including the dummy variable for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. This dummy variable takes a positive value and is clearly signi…cant from a statistical point of view. Thus, airline frequency seems to be higher for short-haul routes. The results of this estimation are available from the authors upon request.
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of the variable for tourism since tourist activity on islands tends to be signi…cant. Hence, we estimate equation (26) for all routes within the corresponding distance range (less or more than 500 kilometers), and then compute the estimation excluding routes that have an island as an endpoint (origin and/or destination) as well. In this latter estimation, we exclude ‡ights from London-Heathrow and London-Gatwick to the continent. We also exclude ‡ights that have any island as destination. Table 1 Amsterdam. Average route distance is about 1; 000 kilometers, a …gure that varies depending on the geographical location of each airport (except in London-Gatwick which is very high). Table 2 shows some preliminary evidence of airline choices concerning frequencies and aircraft size as a function of route distance. For all airlines in our sample, frequencies are substantially higher on short-haul routes than on long-haul ones. Di¤erences in average frequencies between short-haul and long-haul routes are statistically signi…cant when considering all airlines, hubbing airlines at the origin airport, and low-cost carriers. In contrast, planes are bigger on long-haul routes although di¤erences from a statistical point of view are modest. Low-cost airlines are the exception, as they typically use the same type of aircraft on most of their routes. The analysis must take into account other variables that in ‡uence airline choices, but it seems that airlines are required to o¤er high frequencies on short-haul routes. In contrast, they may exploit density economies on long-haul routes from the use of 20 bigger planes at high load factors. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the continuous and discrete variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables have enough variability to capture relevant di¤erences across the routes of the airlines in our sample. Table 4 shows results from estimates of equation (26) for routes of less than 500 kilometers, while Table 5 presents the results for routes of more than 500 kilometers.
We estimate our equation using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Zero Truncated
Poisson (ZTP) techniques. The latter technique allows us to exploit the form of the dependent variable which takes positive integer values. However, since the number of counts is high, we do not expect substantial di¤erences in our results when using either OLS or ZTP. The overall explanatory power of the models estimated is reasonably good. Results are similar when using OLS or ZTP techniques, and the variation in ‡ation factors (VIF) show that multicollinearity is absent in our regressions. Di¤erent speci…cations are estimated with the ZTP technique. Speci…cation (2) is the baseline, speci…cation (3) uses Airportshare k as indicator of airport presence and speci…cation (4) excludes routes with islands as endpoints.
Finally, speci…cation (5) uses the same sample of routes as in speci…cation (4), but it also includes as explanatory variable a dummy variable that captures the presence of high-speed train services, as explained below.
As regards ‡ight frequency and distance, we …nd a positive relationship between airline frequencies and distance for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. This relationship is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level when including routes with islands as endpoints, and is statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level when excluding routes with islands as endpoints.
In terms of elasticities, a 10 percent increase in route distance implies an increase of about percent in airline frequency. Note that 5 percent of the average frequency for routes longer than 500 kilometers is only 38 extra ‡ights per year. So, while the sensitivity of frequency to distance appears similar (though the direction of the e¤ect is di¤erent) for shorter and longer routes, in absolute value the e¤ect is bigger for short-haul markets.
Thus, we provide empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis stated in our theoretical framework. On the one hand, airline frequency decreases with distance on long-haul routes.
From our empirical analysis, this seems to be the case on routes longer than 500 kilometers.
On the other hand, on short-haul routes (routes shorter than 500 kilometers), airline frequency increases with route distance.
Looking at demand shifters at the route level, population has a positive in ‡uence on airline frequency, as expected, although its statistical signi…cance is modest in some of the speci…cations estimated. The role of the city as a political capital has a political in ‡uence on airline frequencies but is only statistically signi…cant on short-haul routes that include a higher proportion of domestic links.
The dummy variable for islands as endpoints has a positive in ‡uence on airline frequencies (as expected) but it is not statistically signi…cant. Moreover, tourism specialization at the destination has a positive in ‡uence on airline frequencies for short-haul routes when routes that have an island as endpoint are excluded. Interestingly, Gross Domestic Product per capita has a statistically signi…cant positive in ‡uence on airline frequencies on long-haul routes but is not a relevant factor on short-haul routes. The variable for intensity of competition is statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level in all the speci…cations. Airline frequencies decrease with the level of route concentration. As expected, airlines compete strongly in frequencies, so the monopolization of a route allows an airline to operate fewer ‡ights.
Concerning airline attributes, the two di¤erent variables used to capture presence at the origin airport have a positive sign and are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level in all the speci…cations. The results for the rest of variables do not change substantially when using one or the other measure of airport presence, so that we present results for speci…cations (1), (2), (4), and (5) for short-haul routes when using the variable Destination k as the indicator of airport presence (recall that speci…cation (3) uses Airportshare k as indicator of airport presence).
The dummy variable for airlines that use the origin airport as spoke is also clearly signif-icant in all speci…cations. Finally, the dummy variable for low-cost carriers is negative and is statistically signi…cant in most of the speci…cations.
The results of variables for intensity of competition and airline attributes are consistent with those obtained by Carlsson (2004) . Indeed, this study analyzes the e¤ect of market structure on ‡ight frequency for a sample of European city-pair markets, …nding that former ‡ag carriers provide more ‡ights than other airlines; and that market concentration has a negative in ‡uence on ‡ight frequency. In this vein, Schipper et al. (2002) …nd that bilateral airline liberalization in Europe led to a higher frequency in city-pair markets for the period
1988-1992.
Note that some air routes in our sample are also a¤ected by competition from highspeed trains. This is particularly the case for routes that have Paris as origin airport. The interaction between air services and high-speed trains is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, this interaction is fully consistent with the empirical predictions of our theoretical model. High-speed trains barely in ‡uence airline behavior on long-haul routes but, on shorter routes, airlines are required to provide higher quality products to prevent travelers from using other transport modes (i.e., cars and trains on certain routes). Table 4 includes as an explanatory factor a dummy variable (denoted by D
Speci…cation (5) in

HST ij
) that takes value 1 for routes on which airlines compete with high-speed train services. 14 Following the de…nition used by the International Union of Railways (Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer -UIC), we consider high-speed train lines to be those lines with trains able to reach a speed above 250 km/h. This dummy variable takes a positive value but is not statistically signi…cant. This result does not mean that airlines and high-speed trains do not compete: it is explained by the fact that airlines are required to o¤er high frequencies on short-haul routes to be competitive against surface transportation modes (either cars or trains). In addition to this, it is worth noting that airlines react to new high-speed services by adjusting aircraft size and maintaining ‡ight frequency. For example, the reaction of Iberia to the new high-speed train service on the route Madrid-Barcelona (the densest route in our sample) was to reduce aircraft size but maintain high frequencies.
Moreover, an accurate analysis of competition between airplanes and trains should take into account the situation before and after the start of high-speed train services since these new 14 Note that we do not estimate the speci…cation (5), which includes the variable for high-speed train services, when considering routes longer than 500 kilometers. In our dataset, a very few number of long-haul routes have available high-speed train services.
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services typically cause a reduction in the number of airlines o¤ering services on the route.
To sum up, we have shown the same result both theoretically and empirically: airline frequency choices are dependent upon competition from private vehicles. Airlines always incur extra costs when adding ‡ights on a route since economies of tra¢ c density require the use of big aircraft at high load factors and each additional ‡ight is associated with additional …xed costs. However, the demand for air services rises with distance on routes where airlines compete with personal transportation since the latter is a slower transportation mode and, in this case, airlines can increase frequency and charge higher fares as they become more competitive.
In this regard, our empirical analysis shows that airlines increase frequency as distance increases on routes shorter than 500 kilometers. Nevertheless, for routes longer than 500 kilometers, on which driving is a dominated alternative, airlines decrease frequency as distance increases. In the latter scenario, the demand for air services may not increase when the origin and destination airports are more remote because some potential travelers may prefer to stay at home, and airlines prefer to save costs by exploiting density economies.
Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to underscore that presence of the personal transportation option crucially a¤ects frequency choice by a provider of scheduled transportation services. We have shown this to be true, using distance as a proxy for the substitutability between higher-speed scheduled services and private vehicles; our …ndings are identi…ed theoretically and tested empirically for the European airline industry. Analysts and policy-makers should consider this factor when analyzing investment in transportation infrastructures and regulation of scheduled services.
A large proportion of air tra¢ c involves short-haul routes where airlines must provide high ‡ight frequency to compete with cars. Our social optimum analysis shows that there is an underprovision of ‡ight frequency supposing that airports are not congested, implying an overuse of personal transportation that may create problems such as pollution, noise and road congestion.
Investing in road infrastructures may place strong pressure on public budgets. In fact, the US Department of Transportation predicts a required expenditure of $225 billion (which 24 represents over 1:5% of the current US GDP) annually for the next 50 years to upgrade the existing road network. In this vein, a major goal in the transportation policy of the European Commission is to alleviate road congestion by promoting the use of scheduled transportation services. 15 Since road and airport infrastructures are communicating vessels, we suggest that policy makers could take into account capacity at national airports as an instrument available to reduce road congestion. Similarly, high-speed train lines providing a high frequency of service may also be useful in alleviating road congestion.
While our empirical application relates to the airline industry (a competitive industry for which relevant data are readily available), our analysis has policy implications for any transport market with private transportation and scheduled services like inter-city and intra-city surface transportation. Furthermore, the logic of the model goes beyond the transportation sector since a similar setup could be used to analyze the behavior of a …rm in situations where better alternatives in certain dimensions are either present or absent. When these alternatives are present, the …rm may be required to …nd other ways to improve its position in the market even when this implies a higher cost; when they are absent, the main concern of the …rm will be related to the customers using its services. Elasticities (evaluated at sample mean) of frequencies with regard to distance (OLS estimation):
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In the ZTP estimation, A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
The case with drivers (Scenario 1) requires 0 < b < e < 1. From the inequality b < e and after some computations we get:
that is represented in the Figure A1 below 
The total di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to a parameter x is df dx = @ =@x @ =@f
. Notice that @ =@f = slope (Cf ) slope (Lf ) and thus @ =@f > 0 because at the equilibrium frequency the slope of Cf exceeds the slope of Lf . Thus we just need to explore the sign of @ =@x.
> 0. We observe that " lowers the height of the cubic curve Cf in Figure 3 so that f ".
@ =@c = df < 0. Then df dc > 0. We observe that c " increases the slope of Lf in Figure 3 so that f ".
< 0. We observe that " decreases the slope of Lf in 
